We consider a group of neighboring smartphone users who are roughly at the same time interested in the same network content, while the users can share content enabled by broadcast device-to-device communications. As the users are selfish in practice, an incentive mechanism is needed to motivate the physically neighboring users to form a social group. We propose a novel concept of equal-reciprocal incentive over broadcast networks, which fairly ensures that each pair of users in the social group share the same amount of content with each other. As the equal-reciprocal incentive may restrict the amount of the shared content, we analyze the optimal equal-reciprocal scheme that maximizes the shared content. While ensuring fairness among users, we show that this optimized scheme also maximizes each user's utility. Finally, we look at dynamic content arrivals and extend our incentive scheme successfully by proposing optimal online scheduling algorithms that achieve the equal-reciprocal incentive.
To Motivate Social Grouping in Wireless Networks
I. INTRODUCTION
A CCORDING to [1] , video traffic will increase to 72% of the total traffic by 2020. Moreover, it becomes more and more popular that people watch videos on their own smartphones or personal devices individually. In fact, half of males, aged 18 -34, look at videos with friends in person [2] . We can expect that a group of friends would be watching live sport-games (like football or soccer), famous TV programs, or on-line courses, such as at a bar, a camping site, or a classroom. In paticular, we are investigating the scenario that a small group of smartphone users within the proximity of each other are almost at the same time interested in the same content from a base-station (BS), illustrated in Fig. 1 . Recently, the scenario is also proposed and implemented as an Android application (e.g., see [3] - [5] ), called the MicroCast system. We then refer to the same content for different users as common interests.
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Co-existence of broadcast BS-to-device (B2D) and broadcast device-to-device (D2D) communications. Users c 1 , c 2 , c 3 are simultaneously interested in the same streaming. device (D2D) communication technologies, as shown in Fig. 1 . Due to the emerging broadcast D2D technology, neighboring users that are physically close can communicate with each other. Through local content sharing over D2D communications, the BS's bandwidth can be saved, e.g., if a user loses content from the BS's broadcast, the user can still obtain it from other users via D2D sharing. In other words, we are leveraging both femto-caching [6] and D2D-caching [7] , where the femto-caches in BSs store common interests for users, while some information can be stored in D2D-chases of local users for possible future sharing.
However, the users are selfish in general; as such, we cannot expect that the selfish users are willing to share their own resources. To facilitate D2D communications by building up a social relationship, there is a critical need to design an incentive mechanism that provides the neighboring users a motivation to form a social group. Moreover, the users would appreciate a free and simple sharing service without complex money exchanges. Hence, we propose a novel non-monentary incentive concept, which is referred to as equal-reciprocal scheme. Applying the equal-reciprocal incentive over the broadcast hybrid networks, the BS impartially requests each pair of the users in the social group to share the same amount of content with each other.
Considering users' heterogeneous B2D channels, as the equal-reciprocal incentive may limit the amount of content the users are willing to share, more questions arise in order to optimize network performance (e.g., throughput or delays):
(1) Which users should share their resource? (2) How much content should the users share with others? We will answer the questions by analyzing the optimal equal-reciprocal scheme that optimizes network performance. Furthermore, we show that the BS and the local users have a win-win situation by using the proposed optimal equal-reciprocal scheme. The optimal equal-reciprocal scheme minimizes the expected time to deliver the common interests to all users, and at the same time it maximizes a utility of each user in the group, where the utility is the difference between the amount of content uploaded from this user and those downloaded from 1536-1276 © 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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the social group. In other words, we are simultaneously solving both global and local optimization problems. Hence, in addition to the fairness resulted from the equal-reciprocal idea, the optimal equal-reciprocal scheme also maximizes each user's utility. Finally, we propose on-line scheduling algorithms, including both optimal centralized and sub-optimal distributed algorithms (easy to implement) to address a more general case of dynamic content arrivals. The algorithms adaptively select a user to share received content in a timely fashion. We will analyze the proposed algorithms from both theoretical and numerical perspectives.
A. Related Work
Traditional incentive schemes for P2P or D2D networks (e.g., the tit-for-tat incentive [8] and [9] - [11] for P2P networks, as well as [12] , [13] for D2D networks) are unicast-based, and do not take full advantage of the broadcast feature of wireless networks. In particular, [13] mentions that few work addressed incentive problems for D2D networks, while [14] also states that many work ignores the broadcast advantage in D2D networks. Despite the broadcast nature of wireless communications, few incentive design in D2D networks takes advantage of the broadcast medium. This work contributes to this emerging line of research.
Of the most relevant literature about incentive design for braodcast D2D networks (which uses social groups or broadcast) is [15] - [18] . The papers [15] , [16] propose auctions over broadcast D2D networks for motivating users to provide some true values, where there is no incentive for content sharing; whereas, a content sharing mechanism is proposed in [20] and [21] for a given social relationship in static networks.
In contrast, we propose a non-monetary incentive scheme over time-varying broadcast networks for motivating neighboring users to form a social group. We can view our proposed equal-reciprocal incentive as a generalization of the existing tit-for-tat scheme for broadcast networks. Better exploiting the broadcast D2D, our scheme will bring many more advantages beyond the tit-for-tat incentive; however, more challenges arise because a broadcast packet will be received by all neighboring users in a group, so the users are co-related with each other. Furthermore, we also consider heterogeneity of wireless channels as well as dynamic content arrivals.
B. Organization
We start with simple symmetric networks in Section II, where all users are associated with the same channel error probability. We study the symmetric networks for developing structures of the optimal equal-reciprocal schemes, which is helpful for later extensions to asymmetric networks in Section III. While Sections II and III focus on analyzing optimal expected performance of a common packet, in Section IV we design a scheduling algorithm optimizing time-average performance subject to incentive constraints for dynamic content arrivals. Our design is not only optimal but is practical for implementation as our algorithm will not need the statistics of time-varying channels and arrivals. We finally extend our discussions in Section V, where we study correlated channels, imperfect D2D communications, as well as a local optimization problem.
C. Remarks
As this work is the first attempt for the design and analysis of non-monetary incentives for broadcast time-varying networks along with time-varying arrivals, our work focuses on networks with the following assumptions:
• Our first focus of the time-varying channels is on the independent and identical distributed model in Sections II -IV, while extending to the Markov modulated model in Section V. • The BS knows the channel states (as will be defined in Section II) before making a decision. • The users are staying in a location for a non-trivial time. We will further discuss these assumptions in the following; however, it would be interesting to extend our work by considering more general channels or mobile users. Moreover, we summarize our notations in Table I .
II. SYMMETRIC NETWORKS
We start with a simple network that includes a BS and two wireless users c 1 and c 2 . The BS has one common packet (i.e., common interest) that needs to be delivered to c 1 and c 2 , respectively, as illustrated in Fig. 2 . This simplified scenario allows us to deliver clear analytic results and clean engineering insights. More general cases will be analyzed in the following sections; in particular, we will investigate dynamic content arrivals in Section IV. We consider a discrete time system, in which the BS can transmit at most one packet in each time slot. Transmissions between the BS and each users are unreliable, where each B2D channel is describe as a time-varying ON/OFF channel. By s(t) = (s 1 (t), s 2 (t)), we describe the channel state vector at time t, where s i (t) = 1 if the BS can successfully transmit a packet to user c i at time t; otherwise, s i (t) = 0. The channel state vector is assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) over time. 1 Moreover, as in many literature (e.g., [21] ), we assume that the BS knows the channel state s(t) before transmitting a packet at time t, by some feedback of channel estimations (e.g, see [22] - [24] for accurate channel prediction schemes). We will relax the assumptions in Section V by considering correlated channels. 2 In this section, we focus on the symmetric users, where the channels have the same error probability, i.e., P(s i (t) = 0) = p e for all t and i , while the asymmetric case will be studied in Section III. In this paper, we do not consider the mobility, i.e., the users are all staying in the same location for a certain amount of time (e.g., in a bar, camping site, or classroom); as such, assume a constant error probability in the following. Definition 1: By completion time we define the expected time the BS takes to successfully deliver the common interest to all users.
Let T = be the completion time for broadcasting the common interest to both users. We then can get
where the first term in the right-hand side (RHS) of Eq. (1) means that both channels are OFF, and therefore the completion time includes one slot of the first transmission as well as another T = ; the second term takes advantage of the broadcast medium when both channels are ON; the third terms represents one slot of delivering to a user along with 1/(1 − p e ) slots on average 3 for another user.
Here, we remark that though traditionally the users communicate with the BS via their cellular links independently 1 In this paper, we consider unreliable communications, i.e., either the BS does not use the rate-adaption to make error-free transmissions, or non-trivial B2D errors still occur with the rate-adaption scheme. As in many other papers, e.g., [19] , [20] , our first focus is on the i.i.d. ON/OFF model to describe the reliability of wireless networks. 2 The imperfect channel estimation and delayed feedback of the estimated channel states are beyond the scope of this paper. 3 If we consider a network consisting of only a BS and a user with its B2D channel error probability p e , the BS takes the expected time of 1/(1 − p e ) to successfully deliver a packet to the user.
(i.e., the BS does not know if both users are requesting the same content; as such, can only unicast their requested packets respectively), in Appendix we will discuss an implementation of identifying the common interest; as such, the BS would deliver the common packet over the broadcast B2D. Moreover, we show that identifying the common interest under the unreliable networks will not that effective, as stated precisely in the following lemma.
Lemma 2: Let T = be the completion time for the BS to deliver the common interest over the unicast B2D. The improvement ratio R =/= (defined below) from identifying the common interest is
In particular, the ratio is 2 when p e = 0; the ratio is 1.25 when p e = 0.5. Proof: Please see Appendix.
We observe that the decrease of the improvement ratio R =/= in p e is faster than a linear function (i.e., a convex function). In particular, when the channels are terrible (i.e., p e → 1), the identification almost cannot decrease the completion time.
A. Motivating Social Grouping
To further utilize the common interest, we take advantage of the existing D2D communication technology. In other words, we are considering the hybrid networks including B2D and D2D communications. We assume that D2D communications do not occupy the same channels as B2D communications. When a user is making a local transmission over a D2D network, the BS can save bandwidth to serve other users. Moreover, we reasonably consider the half-duplex technique, i.e., each user is not allowed to use both B2D and D2D interfaces simultaneously, and cannot transmit and receive a packet at the same time. Because of a short-distance communication, we assume that the D2D channels between the users are noiseless, while imperfect D2D communications will be discussed in Section V-B.
However, the local users are selfish or not cooperative in general, we propose a non-monetary incentive mechanism, called the equal-reciprocal incentive, which fairly requests the users to share the same expected amount of content with each other. By means of the equal-reciprocal incentive scheme, the neighboring users c 1 and c 2 are motivated to form a social group. Here, we assume that the users are rational, who can be motivated by the equal-reciprocal incentive and follow the incentive algorithm, but not malicious, who do not want to share the content. To exclude the malicious users, the users in the social group can exchange a key before any content transfer; as such, users outside the social group cannot decode received packets from the social group. Moreover, the BS can be the identity who isolates the malicious users from the social group, as in the paper the BS is responsible for regulating transmissions between the users, including who should be included in the group and who should share their own content at a time.
We note that the equal-reciprocal incentive for the two symmetric users is similar to the tit-for-tat scheme (based on unicast communications), while it will be quite different and efficient for scenarios of more than two users due to broadcast D2D communications, which will be discussed later. Moreover, we will show that the equal-reciprocal incentive not only provides a fairness guarantee like the tit-fot-tat, but maximizes a local utility assuring that a user can get the maximum amount of content from the social group (see Section V-C).
To analyze the completion time subject to the equalreciprocal incentive, we consider a sharing probability p i→ j that c i shares the received packet with c j when only c i has got the packet. Then, the expected number of packets sent from c i to c j is (1 − p e ) p e p i→ j . To motivate the social grouping with the equal-reciprocal constraint, we need p 1→2 = p 2→1 .
Let T ∪ be the completion time over the broadcast B2D and D2D if c 1 and c 2 are incentivized to form the social group, then
when p 1→2 = p 2→1 . To minimize the completion time, we optimally choose p * 1→2 = p * 2→1 = 1, then we have
Definition 3: An optimal equal-reciprocal scheme is the sharing probabilities that minimize the completion time subject to the equal-reciprocal constraints.
We notice that in this symmetric case, the optimal equalreciprocal scheme does not lose any performance compared to the full cooperation (i.e., both users are always willing to help each other without an incentive scheme). Yet, this is not the case in the asymmetric case, as will be discussed in Section III.
Lemma 4: The improvement from the social grouping is
In particular, the ratio is 1 when p e = 0; the ratio is 1.33 when p e = 0.5. In Lemma 4, such an improvement is due to the local sharing in the D2D network. With the aid of the incentivized social group, the identified common interest can significantly reduce the completion time even in terrible B2D communication environment, i.e., p e → 1 (the ratio is 3 when p e = 1).
B. Large Symmetric Networks
In this subsection, we are extending the discussion to a large network consisting of a BS and N wireless users c 1 , c 2 , · · · , c N . These N users are within the proximity of each other, and desire a common interest. We consider the symmetric users with the same error probability p e .
By T (N) = we denote the completion time over the broadcast B2D. We present T (N) = in recursion: T (0) = = 0, and for all n = 1, · · · , N,
where 1 + T (i) = is the expected number of transmissions under condition that i users do not get the packet from the BS's first broadcast. We show T (N)
We further exploit the local sharing benefit among users by means of the broadcast D2D. We generalize the idea of the equal-reciprocal mechanism by ensuring that each pair in the social group share the same expected amount of content with each other. Due to the broadcast D2D channels among the local users, the analysis of the equal-reciprocal incentive will be different from the tit-for-tat incentive for P2P networks (based on unicast communications).
Let R be the set of remaining users that do not get the packet after the first B2D transmission. By p i→R we denote a sharing probability that user c i shares the packet with R when c i has got the packet.
Lemma 5: The optimal equal reciprocal scheme for the large symmetric network is to pick a user for sharing with the equal probability, i.e., for user c i , the sharing probability is
Proof: We first show that the equal-reciprocal constraints hold. Given |R| users do not get the packet from the first B2D transmission, the conditional expected number of packets sent from user
is the probability that user c i gets the packet from the first B2D broadcast. Similarly, the conditional expected number of packets sent from user c j to c i is also |R| N 2 . As a result, users c i and c j share the same expected number of packets, i.e., the equal-reciprocal constraint holds for all pairs of the local users.
Moreover, since the total sharing probability i / ∈R p * i→R is one according to Eq. (3), if |R| = N (i.e., at least one user gets the packet from the first B2D broadcast), one of the user who is not in R will share the packet in the next time slot; hence, the completion time is two slots for this case. As the completion time will be at least two slots if a user cannot get the packet from the first B2D broadcast, the choice of the sharing probabilities is optimal.
Let T (N) * ∪ be the optimal completion time over the broadcast B2D and D2D, associated with the optimal sharing probability in Eq. (3). Then, we have
where the third term of Eq. (4) reflects the local content sharing in the group, i.e., one of the users that has received the packet in the first time slot will broadcast it such that all users in the group can recover the packet. Note that T (N) * ∪ is monotonic in N, but can be increasing or decreasing due to the tradeoff:
• More users to serve: As the number of local users increases, the probability that all B2D channels are ON decreases; • User diversity increases: As the number of local users increases, the probability that one user receives the packet at the first transmission increases. = is sensitive to p e as shown in Fig. 3 .
When the B2D channels are quite unreliable (i.e., p e > 0.5), a larger social group can better use the user diversity advantage and shorten the completion time.
III. GENERAL ASYMMETRIC NETWORKS
Thus far, the optimal equal-reciprocal scheme can satisfy all symmetric users in the next time slot once one user has got the packet. In this section, we analyze the optimal equal-reciprocal scheme for asymmetric users.
A. Two Asymmetric Users
We first reconsider the simple network in Fig. 2 , but the channel between the BS and each user c i has an error probability p e,i . Without loss of generality, we assume that p e,1 < p e,2 .
1) No Content Sharing: Similar to Eq. (1), if c 1 and c 2 do not share any content, the completion time over the broadcast B2D is
2) Full Cooperation: We consider that c 1 and c 2 are always help each other, which is referred to as a full cooperation. We use this case as a benchmark for later comparison purpose.
The completion time T f for this case is 
where the last two terms indicate the full cooperation: if either one receives the packet, it will share with the other one, resulting in totally two time slots.
With the full cooperation, the expected amount of packets sent from c i to c j is (1 − p e,i ) p e, j p i→ j . As p e,1 < p e,2 , if c 1 and c 2 always help each other, i.e., p 1→2 = p 2→1 = 1, then
We notice that the full cooperation cannot result in a fair situation as on average c 1 needs to share more packets with c 2 . Thus, it is difficult for the selfish c 1 and c 2 to establish the full cooperation.
3) Equal-Reciprocal Incentive: Leveraging the proposed equal-reciprocal incentive to provide the fairness, we then motivate the selfish c 1 and c 2 to form a social group, i.e., we fairly choose a unique sharing probability p i→ j such that
To minimize the completion time, we optimally select
The intuition is that c 2 is associated with a worse B2D channel, so in the long-run it get fewer packets from the BS than c 1 . Hence, to minimize the completion time, it is the best that c 2 always share content, while c 1 share partial content with the same amount as c 2 . Then, the optimal completion time T * ∪ in the presence of the incentivized social group is ) ,
where the last term means that the BS is responsible for retransmitting the packet to c 2 . By comparing T * ∪ and T f , we notice the performance loss from the benchmark case due to the user asymmetry and selfishness. By subtracting Eq. (7) from Eq. (5), we then get the following lemma.
Lemma 7: Under our optimal equal-reciprocal scheme, to motivate the asymmetric c 1 and c 2 to form the social group has a shorter completion time, i.e., T * ∪ ≤ T = . Moreover, the incentivized social group has a performance loss compared with the full cooperation, i.e.,
We further study the performance loss with respect to , by taking the derivative to the equation
( p e,2 + 1 − p 2 e,2 ) 2 , and remark that (1 + 1 1 − p e, 3 ) .
• The increasing rate d d (T * ∪ − T f ) decreases as the difference increases. We find that the performance loss increases as increases; whereas the increasing rate decreases.
B. Large Asymmetric Networks
We focus on a network consisting of three users c 1 , c 2 , and c 3 with the B2D channel error probabilities p e,1 , p e,2 , and p e,3 , respectively, while a more general network can be easily extended. Without loss of generality, we assume that p e,1 ≤ p e,2 ≤ p e, 3 .
We remind that p i→R is the sharing probability of c i with a user set R. According to following eight cases associated with the possible channel states s(t) = (s 1 (t), s 2 (t), s 3 (t)) at time t = 1, we work out the completion time T (3) ∪ for delivering the common interest with social grouping of c 1 , c 2 , c 3 . Let T i be the completion time for case i . 3 ),
where the first term results from the content sharing in the social group, while the second one is due to the re-transmissions from the BS. ∪ . It is easy to calculate the probability P(case i ) of case i ; then, the completion time is
We note that the completion time T
∪ is a linear function of the sharing probabilities, and hence conclude as follows.
Theorem 8: We can get the optimal completion time T (3) * ∪ and the optimal equal-reciprocal scheme (i.e., the optimal sharing probabilities) by formulating a linear program as follows.
Linear program: 3 Subject to the following constraints:
(Const. 1) Equal-reciprocal constraint between c 1 and c 2 :
(Const. 2) Equal-reciprocal constraint between c 1 and c 3 :
Equal-reciprocal constraint between c 2 and c 3 : 3 (1 − p e,2 ) p e,1 · p 3→1,2 + (1 − p e,1 ) p 3→2 .
(Const. 4) For the cases 1, 2, and 3, the total sharing probability to c i is no more than one for all i :
(Const. 5) All sharing probabilities are less than or equal to one.
We remark that the linearity of the completion time still holds for N users; as such, the optimal completion time for the N users can be derived, though complicated, by recursively solving the linear program for i users (poly-time solvable), where 1 ≤ i ≤ N. We want to emphasize that Sections II and III work on the performance analysis of the equalreciprocal incentive for a common interest, whereas we will propose on-line algorithms selecting a user to share at a time, without the complex computation of the sharing probabilities.
As there is no closed-form solution for the linear program, we numerically demonstrate the improvement ratio of Fig. 4 , where each curve is for a particular pair of ( p e,1 , p e,2 ) and starts with p e,3 > p e,2 .
IV. ON-LINE SCHEDULING FOR DYNAMIC CONTENT ARRIVALS
In this section, we further consider time-varying content arrivals at the BS, beyond a single common interest. The objective is to design on-line transmission scheduling algorithms that decide who (i.e., the BS or users) should transmit content for each time. Based on the algorithm, the BS will adaptively select a user to share received content (if needed) such that the equal-reciprocal incentive is met, i.e., the scheduling can serve as the incentive. As the proposed algorithms will be online based, our incentive design does not need to pre-compute the sharing probabilities in advance and would be effective to keep communications in a timely fashion. Moreover, by simply using additional one bit to indicate sharing or not, the users can be informed. In summary, our algorithm is efficient in both time and space.
Different from the previous discussions, networks in this section include queues in the BS to store content that will be delivered to users. For a clear explanation, we present our design in the context of a queueing network in Fig. 5 , where we consider three asymmetric users who are all interested in the packets in the queue. We remark that our design can be easily extended for any number of users, which will be discussed later. We consider the ON/OFF B2D channels and the perfect D2D channels first, while correlated B2D channels and imperfect D2D transmissions are discussed in Section V.
We assume that the arrival process is i.i.d. over time. Let λ be the packet arrival rate to the queue. We say that the queue is stable (see [21] ) if the long-run average queue length is finite. A stability region is the set consisting of all arrival rates λ for which there exists a transmission schedule to stablize the queue. A scheduling algorithm is throughput-optimal if it can stablize the queue for all arrival rates interior of the stability region. Moreover, by we denote an equal-reciprocal stability region that is the stability region subject to the equalreciprocal constraint. We then re-define an optimal equalreciprocal scheme for this dynamic case as follows.
Definition 9: An optimal equal-reciprocal scheme for the dynamic arrivals is a scheduling algorithm that stabilizes the queue and meets the equal-reciprocal constraints for all arrival rates interior of .
In other words, the optimal equal-reciprocal scheme is throughput-optimal subject to the equal-reciprocal incentive. Because of the time-varying channels and content arrivals, scheduling algorithms will depend on the channel state, rate, and queue size.
A. Optimal Centralized Scheduling Under the Equal-Reciprocal Incentive
The proposed algorithm in Alg. 1 has four important parts: virtual network construction, virtual link scheduling, real packet scheduling, and queueing updates, as discussed below.
• Virtual network construction: As the network in Fig. 5 includes the multiple multicasts, the first step of our scheduling design is to create a virtual network as shown in Fig. 6 . In general, we are innovating on the lossy broadcast network by applying prior theory about wireline networks (e.g., Lyapunov theory [21] ). We discuss the idea of the virtual wireline network in the following ten steps. 1) Create a virtual node v a 1,2,3 corresponding to the real queue : If a real packet arrives at the BS, a virtual packet is created in v a 1,2,3 . 2) Create a virtual node v (1, 1,1) 1,2,3 that has the empty queue: The virtual node is the destination of the virtual packets in v a 1,2,3 . If a virtual packet arrives at v (1,1,1) a 1,2,3 , the corresponding real packet is successfully delivered. → v (r 1 ,r 2 ,r 3 ) 1,2,3 associated with an ON/OFF channel for r 1 , r 2 , r 3 = 0, 1 and r i ≥ r i for all i : The virtual link is ON at time t when (i) s i (t) = x if r i = 1, for i = 1, 2, 3 (i.e., if c i has received the packet, re-transmitting the packet does not need to consider the B2D channel to c i ); (ii) s i (t) = r i if r i = 0, for i = 1, 2, 3. 
9) All virtual links cause interference to each other:
That implies that in the real network a user cannot simultaneously transmit and receive a packet and cannot use B2D and D2D interfaces at the same time. 10) Except for the virtual node v (1,1,1) 1,2,3 , other virtual nodes have their own virtual queues.
Let V be the set of all vertices in Fig. 6 . For each time t, if a virtual link u → d is scheduled, a virtual packet is delivered from an upstream virtual node u ∈ V to a downstream virtual node d ∈ V; meanwhile, their virtual queue sizes are updated: V u (t + 1) = max{0, V u (t) − 1} and V d (t +1) = V d (t)+1 (see Lines 16 and 17 of Alg. 1). • Virtual link scheduling: We first design a scheduling algorithm to stabilize the virtual network subject to the equal-reciprocal constraint. We remark that the virtual network can be divided into two parts (see Fig. 6 ), where the left one is related to the local content sharing, while the right one is corresponding to re-transmissions from the BS. Then, the optimal equal-reciprocal scheme will schedule the virtual link such that the virtual queue is stable and the local sharing meets the equal-reciprocal constraints, for all packet arrival rates interior of . To satisfy the equal-reciprocal constraints, in Line 2 of Alg. 1 we introduce other virtual queues h i, j for i = 1, 2 and i + 1 ≤ j ≤ 3, with the virtual queue size H i, j (t) at time t (motivated by [8] ). By n i, j (t) we indicate if at time t the BS broadcasts a packet to c i who will need to store and share the packet with c j when scheduled in the future. That is, if virtual link v a 1,2,3 → v i is scheduled at time t and the channel state s j (t) = 0, then n i, j (t) = 1. We describe the queueing dynamics of h i, j in Line 22 of Alg. 1, and have the following result. 
Dividing both sides above by t yields
Let t → ∞, and we know that the average number of packets shared between c i and c j is equal (i.e.,
) if the virtual queue h i, j is rate stable [21] (i.e., lim t →∞ H i, j (t)/t = 0). We remark that a queue is rate stable if it is stable. Thus, the optimal equal-reciprocal scheme further becomes to schedule the virtual links such that all virtual queues, including the virtual queues in Fig. 6 and h i, j for all i = 1, 2 and i + 1 ≤ j ≤ 3, are stable for all arrival rates interior of . To that end, we apply a back-pressure type algorithm [8] , [21] . Let L be a set of all the virtual links. Hence, we optimally schedule the virtual link set l * ∈ L according to Line 5 with some weights defined in Lines 3 and 4, which are related to the number of served packets if a virtual link is scheduled. • Real packet scheduling: We notice that the transmissions in the real network are associated with the virtual link schedules, as described in Lines 6 -14. • Queueing updates: The updates for the virtual queues have been discussed above as well as summarized in Lines 15 -22.
With the relationship between the real and virtual networks, the real network is stable if and only if the virtual network is stable. Moreover, a more general result is stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 11: The stability region of the virtual network (in Fig. 6) is the same as that of the real network (in Fig. 5 ).
Because the virtual link schedule in Alg. 1 can stabilize all virtual queues and satisfy the equal-reciprocal constraint for all arrival rates interior of , we conclude as follows.
Theorem 12: The proposed on-line scheduling algorithm in Alg. 1 is an optimal equal-reciprocal scheme.
Our scheduling design can be extended to any number of neighboring users. First, each link v a 1,··· → v i in the local sharing part is associated with an ON/OFF channel, which is ON at time t when s i (t) = 1. Second, each link in the re-transmission part is associated with another ON/OFF channel according to the users who have not received the packet yet (similar to the steps 7 and 8 in the virtual network construction). Based on the revised virtual network, the proposed Alg. 1 can be easily generalized.
Regarding the virtual networks, there are 2N vertices and 2N links in the local sharing part, while 2 N vertices and O(4 N ) links in the re-transmission part. Hence, the scheduling algorithm in Eq. (10) needs to find the optimal virtual link among these |L| = O(2N + 4 N ) links. Though we do not propose a polynomial-time algorithm to solve the optimization problem in Eq. (10), it suffices for dealing with a smaller group of neighboring smartphone users, like our problem.
B. Sub-Optimal Distributed Scheduling Under the Equal-Reciprocal Incentive
In Alg. 1, transmissions within the social group are scheduled by the BS, so the BS needs to inform a user to broadcast a packet by sending an additional message. To reduce these control overhead, we hence develop a distributed algorithm in this subsection. The idea is that if a virtual link v a 1,2,3 → v i is scheduled at present, the virtual link v i → v (1, 1,1) 1,2,3 needs to be scheduled in the next time slot. In this way, the broadcasts in the social group do not need to be scheduled by the BS. Hence, the virtual link schedule is made at the beginning of each time, except for the time slot after virtual link v a 1,2,3 → v i is scheduled.
Due to the restriction of the scheduling set, the distributed algorithm leads to a smaller equal-reciprocal stability region (say d ) than the centralized algorithm. Next, we will design a dynamic algorithm that achieves the region d .
The distributed algorithm is similar to Alg. 1 with some modifications as follows:
• First, we re-define the variable as 2, 3  is ON and scheduled;  1 if other link l is ON and scheduled; 0 else.
The notion of the re-defined μ l (t) is that if link v a 1,2,3 → v i , for i = 1, 2, 3, is scheduled at present, the virtual link Algorithm 1 Optimal on-line scheduling algorithm input : A network instance of Fig. 5 output: Scheduling decision for each time /* Virtual network construction */ 1 Construct a virtual network as shown in Fig. 6 ; 2 Add other virtual queues h i, j to the virtual network, for i = 1, 2 and i + 1 ≤ j ≤ 3; /* Virtual link scheduling for each time t */ 3 For each virtual link l = u → d in Fig. 6 , we define a weight W l (t) and a variable μ l (t) as
μ l (t) = 1 if virtual link l is ON and scheduled; 0 else; 4 Define a variable n i, j (t) for i, j = 1, 2, 3 as
/* Real packet scheduling for each time t */ 6 if v a 1,2,3 → v i , for i = 1, 2, 3, is scheduled then 7 the BS transmits the corresponding packet, while c i needs to store the packet and broadcast it when scheduled in the future; 8 end 9 if v i → v (1, 1,1) 1,2,3 is scheduled then 10 user c i is scheduled to share the corresponding packet; 11 end 12 if v a 1,2,3 → v (r 1 ,r 2 ,r 3 )
1,2,3
or v (r 1 ,r 2 ,r 3 )
, for r i = 0, 1, r i ≥ r i , and i = 1, 2, 3, is scheduled then 13 the BS broadcasts the corresponding packet; 14 end /* Virtual queueing update */ 15 foreach virtual link u → d that is scheduled do 16 19 if there is an arrival to v a 1,2,3 then 20 Increase its virtual queue size by 1; 21 end 22 1,1) 1,2,3 must be scheduled in the next time slot; hence, the scheduled packet takes two time slots. • Second, we re-define the set L as the set of all virtual links excluding v i → v (1, 1,1) 1,2,3 for all i = 1, 2, 3. • Then, the virtual link is scheduled as follows. If v a 1,2,3 → v i , for i = 1, 2, 3, is scheduled at present, user c i needs Fig. 7 . Virtual network for the two symmetric users. to broadcast the received packet in the next time slot; otherwise, we select a virtual link based on Eq. (10) with the newly defined μ l (t) and L. We note that size |L| in the distributed algorithm is smaller (i.e., O(N + 4 N )), and thus the complexity of the distributed algorithm is smaller than the centralized one.
We conclude as follows using the frame-based Lyapunov theorem [21] , [25] .
Theorem 13: The distributed scheduling algorithm achieves the region d and satisfies the equal-reciprocal incentive. Moreover, our distributed algorithm has two advantages over the centralized one: requiring no control message exchange with BS and achieving lower complexity.
C. Equal-Reciprocal Stability Regions for the Two Symmetric Users
Though a lower complexity of the distributed algorithm, the distributed algorithm has performance loss in the equalreciprocal stability region. In this subsection, we compare the regions of the centralized and distributed algorithms, with the focus on the local sharing part for the two symmetric users scenario, while a more general network is numerically studied in Section IV-D.
We start with describing the equal-reciprocal stability region of the centralized algorithm. Fig. 7 illustrates the virtual net- work for the two symmetric users. Because of the symmetric users, we can combine both virtual nodes v 1 and v 2 as a virtual node v as shown in Fig. 8 . By ξ 1 , ξ 2 , and ξ 3 we denote the packet service rates of the links v a 1,2 → v (1, 1) 1,2 , v a 1,2 → v, and v → v (1, 1) 1,2 ; then, the region can be expressed as follows.
These constraints come from the fact that the maximum number of packets that can be transmitted at each time is one. By simplifying the above constraints, we derive the equal-reciprocal stability region of the centralized algorithm as follows.
λ ≤ 1 − p 2 e . In Fig. 9 , we show the equivalent virtual network for the distributed algorithm, where we combine the virtual node v 1 , v 2 , and v (1, 1) 1,2 as a virtual node v; as such, the time for transmitting a virtual packet over v a 1, 2 → v is two as it takes into account the time for both link v a 1,2 → v i and v i → v (1, 1) 1,2 for i = 1, 2. Therefore, we segment the timeline into frames, which size is one or two time slots if the virtual link v a 1,2 → v (1, 1) 1,2 or v a 1,2 → v, respectively, is scheduled. Similar to [25] , we then can derive the equal-reciprocal capacity region of the distributed algorithm as
where the left term is the expected number of arrivals in a frame and the right one is the maximum number of packets that can be transmitted within a frame. We show both stability regions in Fig. 10 and conclude as follows. Lemma 14: For the two symmetric users, the ratio of the equal-reciprocal stability region between the centralize and the distributed algorithms is 1 + 2 p e − 2 p 2 e . Moreover, when p e = 1/2, the distributed algorithm has the largest stability region loss (see Fig. 10 ).
D. More Numerical Studies
In this subsection, we numerically study the proposed algorithms for the network in Fig. 5 , where we fix the channel Fig. 10 . Equal-reciprocal stability region comparison between the centralized and distributed algorithms. error probabilities of c 1 , c 2 , c 3 to be 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, respectively. We will compare the proposed centralized and distributed algorithms with a throughput-optimal scheduling algorithm without incentivizing the social grouping, i.e., all virtual links in the local sharing part of Fig. 6 are removed, in terms of the following metrics:
• Average queue size; • Average completion time;
• Local content sharing probability: the ratio of packets that are shared among the users c 1 , c 2 , or c 3 (i.e., #total packets shared by the users #total packets at the BS ). All the results are averaged over 100,000 slots.
We show the average queue size and the average completion time of a packet in Figs. 11 and 12. We observe that the approximate distributed algorithm still outperforms the throughput-optimal algorithm without social grouping, and its performance is close to the centralized algorithm. Moreover, we demonstrate the local content sharing probability in Fig. 13 . We notice that the local sharing probability increases as the packet arrival rate increases.
Finally, we show the 95% confidence intervals of the average queue size (see Fig. 11 ) in Table II under the normality approximation by the central limit theory. Since the queue size can vary from zero to a larger number if the arrival rate is higher, the intervals increases as the arrival rate increases. However, our average results are still highly concrete because of the relatively short confidence intervals.
V. FURTHER DISCUSSIONS
We further discuss the equal-reciprocal scheme by considering correlated channel models, unreliable local communications, and a local utility of each individual user.
A. Channels With Memory
In this subsection, we extend our results to channel models with memory. To get a clear engineering insight, we investigate the two symmetric users in Section II again. In particular, we consider a two-state Markov chain as the channel model, with the state s i (t) ∈ {0, 1} at time t and the stationary transition probabilities ζ i, j from state i to j , i.e., ζ 01 = P(s i (t + 1) = 1|s i (t) = 0), and ζ 10 = P(s i (t + 1) = 0|s i (t) = 1). Then, we can get the steady-state probabilities π 0 = ζ 10 /(ζ 01 + ζ 10 ) and π 1 = ζ 01 /(ζ 01 + ζ 10 ).
Let T i j be the expected time from state i to j , which can be calculated by the following equation.
We hence can calculate the completion time T = at the steady state:
Similar to Section II-A, we get T * ∪ = (−2π 2 0 + 2π 0 + 1)/(1 − π 2 0 ). To conclude, we find the improvement ratio is
The improvement ratio is 1 when ζ 01 = 1; the ratio is 1.33 when ζ 01 = ζ 10 = 0.5; the ratio is 3 when ζ 01 → 0, which is consistent with Lemma 4. In other words, our results and engineering intuition can be extended to the Markovmodulated channel.
Remark 15: Regarding the dynamic arrivals, the proposed on-line Alg. 1 can be extended to finite-state Markovmadulated channel models (states for different channel qualities). That can be proven using the frame-based Lyapunov technique [21] , where the frame sizes are the recurrence times. We also notice that the channel qualities can be directly affected by the B2D distances; as such, we can study the mobile users by the Markov-modulated channel models. 
B. Unreliable Local Communications
We reconsider the simple two symmetric users, but the channel between the two users can be OFF with a probability γ . To that end, we assume that the BS has to decide if a user will share a packet when receiving it. In other words, the users will keep a copy of each packet only if being informed of sharing. We get T ∪ :
) .
Then, if γ ≤ p e , the optimal sharing probability p * 1→2 = 1; moreover,
and the improvement ratio is
If γ ≤ p e , the ratio is 1 when p e = 0, and 3 when p e = 1, which is consistent with Lemma 4 again; moreover, the ratio is 2 0.5/(1−γ )+1 when p e = 0.5, where there is a performance loss due to γ . Otherwise, if γ ≥ p e , the optimal sharing probability p * 1→2 = 0, i.e., there is be no cooperation. As usually local short-distance communication quality is better than longdistance communications with remote the BS, to motivate the local users to construct a social group would be promising, though there will be a little bit performance loss due to the imperfect D2D (see Eq. (11)).
Remark 16: Alg. 1 can be extended for unreliable D2D networks, while the local sharing part would be similar to the retransmission part but the corresponding link error probabilities are associated with the error probabilities between the users.
C. Individual Performance Under the Optimal Equal-Reciprocal Scheme
Subject to the equal-reciprocal constraint, the users are motivated to form a social group because of the fairness guarantee, while the optimal equal-reciprocal scheme minimizes the completion time. We finally discuss whether and how the optimal equal-reciprocal scheme further benefits each individual user.
We define a utility u i of user c i as the difference between the amount of packets downloaded from social groups and those uploaded from user c i :
The motivation of the utility is that long-distance B2D communications are more expensive than local D2D communications (e.g., see [2] ), and therefore a user would like to save cost by downloading content from a social group while only upload a smaller amount of content in return.
First, we notice that the tit-for-tat incentive results in the zero utility due to the unicast communications. We show in the next theorem that the optimal equal-reciprocal scheme maximizes the local utility of each user subject to the equal reciprocal constraint.
Theorem 17: The optimal equal-reciprocal scheme (in Sections II and III) (locally) maximizes the utility u i of each individual c i , for all i , subject to the equal-reciprocal constraint.
Proof: Let α i→ j be the expected amount of content user c i shares with c j . Due to the equal-reciprocal constraint, we need α j →i = α i→ j for all i, j . Then, the utility u i depends on α i→ j for all j .
For a user c i , we assume the optimal equal-reciprocal scheme results in α * i→ j for all j . We consider two cases as follows:
• α i→ j < α * i→ j for some j : Because of the broadcast medium and the equal-reciprocal constraint, each user can get at least one packet in return when broadcasting a packet. Hence, the utility is an increasing function in
Then, more content can be shared among users subject to the equal-reciprocal constraint, and the completion time can be further reduced. We then get a contraction to the optimality of α * i→ j . Hence, u i (α i→ j ) < u i (α * i→ j ). By fully considering the two cases, we conclude that the optimal equal-reciprocal scheme also (locally) maximizes the local utility of each individual.
Remark 18: To motivate social grouping with the optimal equal-reciprocal incentive benefits not only the BS (i.e., reduce the completion time), but also users (i.e., save cost). The optimal incentive scheme is a win-win strategy. In particular, the optimal equal-reciprocal scheme provide two incentives for users: (1) fairness from the equal-reciprocal constraint, and (2) local utility maximization.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we consider a practical MicroCast network scenario and propose the equal-reciprocal incentive scheme to motivate social grouping. We theoretically investigate the optimal equal-reciprocal scheme, and show that the optimal equalreciprocal mechanism is a win-win policy that improves the performance of both BSs and local users. Finally, we propose on-line scheduling algorithms that dynamically select a user to share content. We conclude that the network performance can be upgraded using the proposed social grouping and on-line algorithms. Interesting extensions of this work include mobile users and cache capacity of users. APPENDIX B2D BROADCAST BY EXPLOITING THE COMMON INTEREST Traditionally, the users communicate with the BS via their cellular links independently. To implement the social grouping, one of the users in a group can initiate a streaming session; then, the BS will identify the common interest and deliver the common interest over the broadcast B2D; moreover, a new user can join the existing group. These functions have been implemented in the MicroDownload system [3]- [5] , which is a component of the MicroCast system.
Here, we analyze the benefit from the common interest in the time-varying ON/OFF network. Let T = be the completion time if the BS uses the traditional unicast to deliver the common interest to c 1 , c 2 (i.e., without identifying the common interest). We notice that T = < 2/(1 − p e ) as the BS knows the channel state vector in advance and hence can schedule a packet to transmit if the associated channel is ON. Then, we express T = as follows. 
